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Cost minimizing sequential
punishment policies for repeat
offenders
Evgenia Motchenkova
Department of Economics, VU University Amsterdam, 1081 HV Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
E-mail: emotchenkova@feweb.vu.nl
This article discusses optimal sanctions for repeat offenders. We analysed a
multi-period decision problem, where the regulator’s main objectives are to
block any violations of law and to minimize the costs of crime control. We
conclude that, when offenders are identical and wealth constrained, the govern-
ment is resource constrained, can perfectly observe illicit gains and commits to a
certain policy throughout the whole planning horizon, forward-looking solution
implies that cost minimizing deterrence is decreasing in the number of offenses.
This analysis is relevant in case when imprisonment is not commonly used, only
monetary sanctions are allowed and limited liability of offenders plays an
important role. The examples are tax evasion, violations of environmental
regulations and violations of competition law.
Keywords: crime and punishment; crime prevention; repeat offenders
JEL Classiﬁcation: K14; K42; C61
I. Introduction
The principle of escalating sanctions based on offense
history is widely accepted and embedded in many penal
codes and sentencing guidelines. Penalty escalation char-
acterizes not only traditional crimes such as theft and
murder, but also violations of competition law, violations
of environmental regulations and tax evasion.
A number of recent contributions have tried to verify
whether or not a sanction scheme that minimizes the
(expected) social costs indeed has the property of sanc-
tions increasing with offense history. So far it has been
established in the law and economics literature that under
certain circumstances escalating penalty schemes may be
optimal. There are a number of studies, for example by
Rubinstein (1979, 1980), Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991),
Polinsky and Shavell (1998), Baik and Kim (2001), Chu
et al. (2000), Miceli and Bucci (2005) or Endres and
Rundshagen (2012), which provided justiﬁcations for
escalating penalties. Other studies, however, show that
for various reasons, optimal deterrence may actually
involve declining penalties for repeat offenders (see, for
example, Burnovski and Safra (1994); Dana (2001);
Emons (2003) or Emons (2007)1).
Our analysis supports the second stream of literature. In
this article we study the problem of optimal sanctions for
repeat offenders in a multi-periods model that bridges
n-period model of Burnovski and Safra (1994) and a
two-period model suggested in Emons (2003). We extend
the two-period result of declining penalties obtained in
Emons (2003). While doing that we also generalize
Burnovski and Safra (1994) study by deriving the optimal
policy which is not only aimed at reducing the number of
crimes, but also minimizes enforcement costs. In addition,
1Although, Emons (2007) ﬁnds partial support for both hypotheses.
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our framework also allows to derive unconditional2 result
of declining penalties for repeat offenders, which was not
achieved in Burnovski and Safra (1994).
II. The Model
In this section we analyse an n-period repeated game,
where the regulator’s main objective is to block any viola-
tions of law and, at the same time, to minimize the costs of
crime control. We describe a forward-looking solution, i.
e. the offender and the regulator can commit to a certain
strategy from the beginning of the game and the regulator
does not change the parameters of the penalty scheme
(ﬁne and probability of control) till the end of the planning
horizon. In that case we can consider a multi-period opti-
mization problem of a cost minimizing regulator whose
aim is to block violations of law. The solution of this
problem gives the desired result of complete deterrence.
Even the ﬁrst crime never happens, unless beneﬁts from
crime are much higher than the initial wealth of the
offender.
We consider a continuum of potential offenders which
has measure 1. Individuals or ﬁrms live for n periods. In
each period, the agents can engage in an illegal activity,
such as polluting the environment or evading taxes. If an
agent commits the act in either period he receives a mone-
tary beneﬁt b > 0. Following Polinsky and Rubinfeld
(1991) b is the illicit gain and the crime creates no accep-
table gain. The act causes a monetary harm h > 0 to the
society and, thus, has to be deterred. We assume that the
following inequality is satisﬁed, h > b, so that the act is
not socially desirable.
To achieve deterrence the government chooses sanc-
tions and a probability of apprehension. The regulator
cannot tell in which period of its life the individual is. It
can only observe the information after the crime has been
discovered. Hence, the regulator only observes whether
the crime is the ﬁrst or second or nth one. Accordingly, the
government applies ﬁnes s1; s2; :::; sn  0; where si is the
penalty in case the offense by this particular agent is
recorded by the authority already i times. Moreover, the
government chooses a rate of law enforcement, p; which
can also be seen as the probability of apprehension. We
assume that p is the same for all (ﬁrst time and repeated)
offenses. Since apprehension is costly, the government
wishes to minimize p.
The overall objective of the regulator is to reduce the
number of crimes. Subject to that objective being reached,
the regulator aims to minimize costs of control, p. So, the
objective function of the regulator can be written as
max ðpþ HkÞ, where p is the probability of control
(or rate of law enforcement), k is the number of crimes,
and H is the disutility from crime for the regulator, which
is assumed to be a large positive number.
The agents are risk neutral and maximize expected
income. They have initial wealth W > 0 and hold it over
all n periods unless the government interferes with sanc-
tions. We may think of W as the value of the privately
owned house or assets with a long maturity. Any addi-
tional income that agents receive in any of the periods, be
it through legal or illegal activity, is consumed immedi-
ately, and the maximum of what the government can
extract from the agents is W.3 If the ﬁne exceeds the
agent’s wealth, he goes bankrupt and the government
seizes the remaining assets. This implies that the ﬁnes
s1; s2; :::; sn have to satisfy the ‘budget constraint’Pn
i¼1
si ¼ W : To simplify the analysis we also assume no
discounting.
An agent chooses the number of crimes that can be
committed or, in other words, he can choose between the
following strategies:
Not to commit a criminal act at all. Then, the utility
from this strategy for the ‘offender’ has the following
form Uð0; 0; :::; 0Þ ¼ W :
Commit crime only once in any of the periods. The utility
for the offender equals Uð1; 0; :::; 0Þ ¼ W þ b ps1:
Commit crime in any two periods: Uð1; 1; 0; :::; 0Þ ¼
W þ b ps1 þ b pð1 pÞs1  p2s2:
Commit crime in any three periods: Uð1; 1; 1; :::; 0Þ ¼
Uð0; 1; 1; 1; :::; 0Þ¼Uð0; 0; :::; 0; 1; 1; 1Þ¼W þ bps1þ
bpð1 pÞs1  p2s2 þ bð1 pÞ2ps1  2p2ð1pÞs2
p3s3:
Commit crime in all n periods: U 1; 1; 1; . . . ; 1ð Þ ¼
W þ bps1þbp 1pð Þs1  p2s2 þ b 1 pð Þ2ps1
2p2 1 pð Þs2  p3s3 þ . . . . . .þ b C0n1 1pð Þ
 n1
ps1þ
C1n1 1 pð Þn2p2s2 þ C2n1 1 pð Þn3p3s3 þ . . . :þ Cn2n1
1pÞpn1sn1 þ Cn1n1pnsn

;

where coefﬁcients of these polynomials are formed
according to the following formula:
Ckh ¼
h!
k!ðh kÞ! ; h  k
We impose the following assumptions on the parameters
0 < p < 1; b > 0;W > 0: The possibility p ¼ 0 does not
make sense, since then there is no threat for the agent to be
convicted and no way to prove the criminal to be guilty.
We also assume that agents have enough wealth so that
2Without restriction on probability of detection being sufﬁciently small.
3 This assumption may seem to be restrictive. In most of the cases, for example, in the case of tax evasion or illegal price-ﬁxing activities,
the penalty takes into account not only initial wealth of the ﬁrm but also accumulated rents from illegal activities. However, this
assumption is adopted here in order to focus on obtaining analytical results with respect to establishing an optimal sequence of sanctions.
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deterrence is always possible, i.e. nb <
Pn
i¼1
si  W .
Further, we derive sanctions that give the agents the proper
incentives not to engage in criminal activities in either
period. This means, we derive a penalty scheme which
ensures Uð1; 0; :::; 0Þ < Uð0; 0; :::; 0Þ; Uð1; 1; :::; 0Þ <
Uð0; 0; :::; 0Þ; :::; Uð1; 1; :::; 1Þ < Uð0; 0; :::; 0Þ: These
are included as constraints in the following optimization
model. The aim of the regulator to prevent crime and to
minimize the enforcement costs is reﬂected in the objective
function (1) below, whereas the aim to provide incentives
for the agents not to commit any crime is reﬂected in
incentive constraints (2)–(n + 1).
min pþ Hk (1)
s.t.
b ps1 < 0 (2)
2b ps1  pð1 pÞs1  p2s2 < 0 (3)
3b ps1  pð1 pÞs1  p2s2  ð1 pÞ2ps1
 2p2ð1 pÞs2  p3s3 < 0
(4)
lb
Xl
h¼1
Xh
k¼1
Ck1h1ð1 pÞhkpksk < 0 (lþ 1)
nb
Xn
h¼1
Xh
k¼1
Ck1h1ð1 pÞhkpksk < 0 ðnþ 1Þ
s1 þ s2 þ ::::: þ sn1 <W ðnþ 2Þ
s1  0; s2  0; ::::; sn1  0; p > 0 ðnþ 3Þ
The Lagrangian for this problem has the following form:
L ¼ p
Xn
j¼1
λj½jb
Xj
h¼1
Xh
k¼1
Ck1h1ð1 pÞhkpksk 
 λðs1 þ s2 þ ::::þ sn1  wÞ
(5)
Using Kuhn–Tucker conditions to solve the minimization
problem (1)–(n + 3), we obtain the result stated in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The optimal cost minimizing sanction
scheme sets the penalty for the ﬁrst detected violation
equal to the entire wealth of the agent, and for all sub-
sequent violations the penalties will be equal to zero, i.e.
s1 ¼ W and s2 ¼ ::: ¼ sn ¼ 0: The probability of law
enforcement is constant over time and equals p, which
represents the smallest positive solution of the polynomial
of order n in p; given by expression (A10).
The proof of Proposition 1 consists of several steps:
ﬁrst, we derive ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) and comple-
mentary slackness conditions of the minimization pro-
blem described above; second, based on the FOCs we
prove Lemma 3, which states that inequality @L@sl >
@L
@slþ1
holds for any time period l 2 f1; :::; n 1g; ﬁnally,
applying Lemma 3 and the complementary slackness con-
ditions we obtain the optimal penalty schedule with
s1 ¼ W and s2 ¼ ::: ¼ sn ¼ 0 and p > 0.
For detailed proof see Appendix.
The intuition behind this proposition follows from the
incentive constraints. The agent pays the sanction s1 with
probability p, while any further sanction will be paid with
lower probability. Hence, since paying the ﬁrst ﬁne is
more likely than paying any subsequent ﬁne, shifting
resources from the last periods to s1 increases deterrence
for given p. Consequently, as in Emons (2003), p is mini-
mized by putting all scarce resources into s1.
Example 2: Figure 1 illustrates the proof graphically in
the ðp; s1Þ diagram for the two-period case. The game in
this case is described as follows. A strategy of player 1
(regulator) is given by σ ¼ ðp; s1; s2Þ; whereas the strat-
egy set of player 2 (offender, or ﬁrm) is given by f0; 1; 2g:
In case n ¼ 2, the optimization problem of the sregu-
lator will be as follows:
min pþ Hk
s.t. b ps1 % 0 (1), 2b ps1  pð1 pÞs1 p2s2 % 0
(2), s1 þ s2 % W (3), 0 < p % 1
s1 A
3
                                                        (1) 
0 1p* p(2)
Fig. 1. Graphical illustration of solution in two-period case.
Parameter values b = 1,W = 3
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Taking into account that b > 0;W > 2b; s2 ¼ W  s1,
the solution of this problem, which has the form
s1 ¼ W ; s2 ¼ 0; p ¼ p > 0, is represented by point A in
Fig. 1.
III. Conclusions
We ﬁnd that, when offenders are identical and wealth
constrained, illicit gains are perfectly observable, the gov-
ernment is resource constrained and can commit to a
certain policy throughout the whole planning horizon,
forward-looking solution implies that cost minimizing
deterrence is decreasing, rather than increasing, in the
number of offenses. We prove that for the agents who
may commit an act several times, optimal sanctions are
such that the ﬁne for the ﬁrst crime equals the offender’s
entire wealth, and the ﬁnes are zero for all the subsequent
crimes. Since the agent can only be a repeat offender if he
has been a ﬁrst-time offender, there are no further offenses
if we completely deter the ﬁrst one. This conclusion also
supports the result obtained by Emons (2003) for a two-
period model.
This result contradicts the widely prevailing escalating
penalties imbedded in many penal codes and sentencing
guidelines and might be of limited applicability due to
restrictive assumptions we make. However, the analysis
presented in this article is particularly relevant for a
number of violations for which imprisonment is not
commonly used, only monetary sanctions are allowed,
and limited liability of offenders plays an important role.
This is the case for, for example, tax evasion, violations
of environmental regulations and violations of competi-
tion law in Europe.4 In those settings, assumption that
agents are wealth constrained becomes particularly
important.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. To derive the FOCs we take partial derivatives
of expression (5) with respect to all n 1 variables,
which denote the penalties in the corresponding periods.
Recall that, taking into account that the budget constraint
must be binding, sn can be expressed through all the
unknowns and initial wealth as follows sn ¼ W 
Pn1
i¼1
si:
So, differentiating and simplifying the expressions, we
obtain n 1 FOCs w.r.t. penalties (A1)–(A4) and one
FOC w.r.t. probability of law enforcement (A9). nþ 1
complementary slackness conditions are reﬂected in
expressions (A5)–(A8) below.
@L
@s1
¼ pð1 pÞ0
Xn
i¼kþ1
λi
þ
Xn1
k¼1

C0k pð1 pÞk
 Xn
i¼kþ1
λi

 λnpn  λ  0 ð¼ 0 if s1 > 0Þ
(A1)
@L
@s2
¼
Xn1
k¼1

C1k p
2ð1 pÞk1
 Xn
i¼kþ1
λi

 λnpn  λ  0 ð¼ 0 if s2 > 0Þ
(A2)
@L
@sl
¼
Xn1
k¼l1

Cl1k p
lð1 pÞkðl1Þ
 Xn
i¼kþ1
λi

 λnpn  λ  0 ð¼ 0 if sl > 0Þ
(A3)
@L
@sn1
¼
Xn1
k¼n2

Cn2k p
n1ð1 pÞkðn2Þ
 Xn
i¼kþ1
λi

 λnpn  λ  0 ð¼ 0 if sn1 > 0Þ
(A4)
Complementary slackness conditions are
λ1  0 ðλ1  ð2Þ ¼ 0Þ (A5)
λ2  0 ðλ2  ð3Þ ¼ 0Þ (A6)
λn  0 λn  nþ 1ð Þ ¼ 0ð Þ (A7)
λ  0

λ 
Xn1
i¼1
si W

¼ 0

(A8)
@L
@p
¼ 0 (A9)
Next, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For any l 2 f1; :::; n 1g and p < 12 , we
have that @L@sl <
@L
@slþ1
:
Proof. The proof of this lemma is based on mathe-
matical induction argument and is available from the
author upon request.
Next, using the result of Lemma 3, we derive the
optimal penalty schedule.
We start by showing that constraint (n + 2) is always
binding.
In case this constraint is not binding, there are three
possibilities:
(1)
Pn1
i¼1
si < W and si > 0 for all i 2 f1; :::; n 1g;
(2)
Pn1
i¼1
si < W and si ¼ 0 for all i 2 f1; :::; n 1g;
(3)
Pn1
i¼1
si < W and si ¼ 0 for some i 2 f1; :::; n 1g:
The result of Lemma 3 immediately implies that the solu-
tion with si > 0 for all i 2 f1; :::; n 1g is impossible.
Consider
Pn1
i¼1
si < W and si ¼ 0 for all
i 2 f1; :::; n 1g: Then, the ﬁrst-order conditions (A1)–
(A4) imply that @L@si < 0 for all i 2 f1; :::; n 1g.
Moreover, λ ¼ 0. However, then, considering the last
period n 1; we obtain that @L@sn1 ¼
Pn1
k¼n2
½Cn2k pn1ð1 pÞkðn2Þð
Pn
i¼kþ1
λiÞ  λnpn ¼ pn1λn1þ
npn1λnð1 pÞ > 0: Hence, condition (A4) cannot be
strictly negative. This implies that the outcome with
si ¼ 0 for all i 2 ½1; n 1 and λ ¼ 0 also cannot arise
as a solution of the minimization problem of the regulator.
Next, consider
Pn1
i¼1
si < W and si ¼ 0 for some
i 2 f1; :::; n 1g: Assume sl ¼ 0 for l < n 1: This
means that Equation A3 must be nonpositive. But we
have just shown that @L@sn1 > 0. Hence, using Lemma 3,
we can conclude that this outcome also cannot be a
solution.
The outcome with
Pn1
i¼1
si ¼ W and si ¼ 0 for
i < k 2 f1; :::; n 1g and sl > 0 for
l < k 2 f1; :::; n 1g is impossible due to the result of
Lemma 3.
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Moreover, the outcome with
Pn1
i¼1
si ¼ W and s1 > 0,
s2 > 0 and si ¼ 0 for all i 2 f3; :::; n 1g cannot arise.
Consider s1 > 0, s2 > 0. Using Equations A1 and A2 we
obtain that @L@s1 ¼ @L@s2 ¼ 0: But, this again contradicts the
result of Lemma 3.
We conclude that only the following is possible:
s1 > 0; s

2 ¼ ::: ¼ sn ¼ 0 and
Pn1
i¼1
si ¼ W , which implies
that s1 ¼ W ; s2 ¼ ::: ¼ sn ¼ 0:
Finally, optimal behaviour implies that only condition
(n + 1) on the beneﬁts from crime will be binding, so that
λ1 ¼ λ2 ¼ ::: ¼ λn1 ¼ 0 and λn  0.5 Hence, the expres-
sions for the optimal probability of law enforcement,
p; λ and λn will be determined from conditions (n + 1),
@L
@s1
¼ 0 and @L@p ¼ 0: In particular, p is given by the
solution of the polynomial of order n speciﬁed in expres-
sion (A10) below with s1 ¼ W ; s2 ¼ 0; :::; sn ¼ 0:
nb
Xn
h¼1
Xh
k¼1
Ck1h1ð1 pÞhkpksk ¼ 0 (A10)
End of the proof of Proposition 1.
5 The fact that only constraint (n + 1) on the beneﬁts from crime is binding when s1 ¼ W ; s2 ¼ ::: ¼ sn ¼ 0 can be proven by
contradiction. Detailed proof is available from the author upon request. The intuition is as follows. Assume, for example, that constraint
ðl þ 1Þ is binding for some l 2 f2; :::; n 1g; then it follows that the LHS of the constraint ðl þ 2Þ has to be strictly positive, which is
impossible by construction of the problem.
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